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Abstract
The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classi-
cal) answers to questions about “equivalences” between metaphysical theories and to
the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. var-
ious versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism).
In this paper, I will do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical
debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians,
namely the problem of how material objects persist through time: the endurantism
versus perdurantism controversy. It has been argued that this debate is a good exam-
ple of a merely verbal one, where two allegedly competing views are in fact translata-
ble one into each other – they end up, contrary to appearances, to be equivalent. In
my closer look at this debate, I will conclude that this is correct, but only to some
extent, and that there does remain room for substantive disagreement.
Secondly, and stemming from my considerations about the persistence debate, I will
defend a metaontological view that emphasizes that when asking the question “Are
metaphysical debates substantive or verbal?”, the correct answer is “It depends.”
Some debates are substantive, some debates are merely verbal, and sometimes it is
true that a problem or a question can be formulated in equally good frameworks
where there is no fact of the matter as to which one is correct or where we just
cannot know it. Furthermore, importantly, as my examination of the persistence de-
bate will show, there is room for the view that a debate is largely merely verbal but
not entirely and that some parts of it are substantive, and decidable by philosophical
methods. It is possible, and it is the case with respect to the persistence debate, that
inside a debate some points are merely verbal while other are places of substantive
disagreement. A moral of this is that, at the end of the day, the best way to do
meta-metaphysics is to do first-level metaphysics.
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1. Introduction, Methodology
The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or
less classical) answers to questions about “equivalences” between metaphy-
sical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are sub-
stantive or merely verbal. On the one side realists, such as for instance
Sider (2001c, 2007, 2008, 2011), claim that metaphysical disputes are
substantive and that metaphysical questions do have objective answers,
while on the other side various kinds of anti-realists such as Sidelle
(2002), Chalmers (2008) and Yablo (2008) defend the opposite view
that metaphysical questions do not have objective answers and that they
can be formulated and answered in different frameworks, where there is
no fact of the matter as to which framework is the correct one. Epistemi-
cists, such as for instance Bennett (2008), put forward a sort of a moder-
ate view inbetween realism and anti-realism that says that some metaphy-
sical questions do have genuine objective answers but that often we
cannot discover them. As a consequence, it becomes difficult to motivate
the decision to choose one side over the other. There are also moderate
anti-realists, such as Hirsch (2005, 2007, 2008), who claim that many
metaphysical debates are merely verbal disputes where the disputants
seem to be saying different things but in fact they are making the same
claims only formulated in different ways, or different “alternative” lan-
guages. In Benovsky (2008), I have argued that a kind of this moderate
anti-realism applies to the debate between the bundle theory and the
substratum theory.
In this paper, I will do two things. First, I shall have a close look at
one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest
for many of those who work on meta-metaphysics, namely the problem
of how objects persist through time: the endurantism versus perdurant-
ism controversy. McCall & Lowe (2003), Miller (2005) and Hirsch
(2008) have all argued, for different reasons and in different ways, that
this debate is a good example of a merely verbal one, where two alleg-
edly competing views are in fact translatable one into each other – they
end up, contrary to appearances, to be equivalent. In my closer look at
this debate, I will conclude that this is correct, but only to some extent,
and that there does remain room for substantive disagreement. To do
this, I shall proceed differently: instead of looking for a general way to
translate or to make equivalent the two (actually, more, as we shall see)
competing views, I will go through several first-level metaphysics steps
and look for places where alleged disagreement turns out to be merely
verbal.
Secondly, and stemming from my considerations about the persistence
debate, I will defend a metaontological view that emphasizes a point that I
think is often taken and acknowledged by many of those who are involved
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in metaontology, but that is not so often explicitly defended,1 namely, that
when asking the question “Are metaphysical debates substantive or ver-
bal?”, the correct answer is “It depends.” Some debates are substantive,
some debates are merely verbal, and sometimes it is true that a problem or
a question can be formulated in equally good frameworks where there is
no fact of the matter as to which one is correct or where we just cannot
know it. Furthermore, importantly, as my examination of the persistence
debate will show, there is room for the view that such a debate is largely
merely verbal but not entirely and that some parts of it are substantive,
and decidable by philosophical methods. It is possible, and it is the case
with respect to the persistence debate, that inside a debate some points are
merely verbal while other are places of substantive disagreement. A moral
of this is that, at the end of the day, the best way to do meta-metaphysics
is to do first-level metaphysics, from which meta-metaphysical claims (such
as equivalence claims) can arise. The priority should be given to the low-
level considerations, and meta-metaphysical claims should not be made in
a too general way but should come from particular decisions taken case by
case on the level of metaphysics.
2. Perdurantism versus Endurantism
Perdurantism comes in two main versions – the worm view and the stage
view – and endurantism comes also in two main versions – indexicalism
and adverbialism. I will now carefully compare these four views, and in a
way that is different from considerations put forward by McCall & Lowe
(2003), Miller (2005) and Hirsch (2008), we will see that some of these
traditional enemies (namely, the perdurantist worm view and the various
endurantist theories) actually are very much alike, and that some alleged
points of substantive dispute fall prey to closer scrutiny.
A good way to see how the perdurantist worm view and its alleged
opponents work is by examining how these theories handle the case of
intrinsic change through time. My neighbour Cyrano, for instance, had a
big nose, but after some time he discovered a new easy, painless and very
quick plastic surgery method that could replace his big nose with a small
one. He decided to undergo the procedure and consequently he now has a
small nose. In this case, Cyrano then undergoes intrinsic change – he first
has a big nose and then a small one. What the worm view theorists claim
here is that Cyrano is a space-time worm, that is, a temporally extended
entity that has temporal parts at every time at which it exists, and that his
possession of different incompatible properties at different times is a mat-
1 See also Bennett (2008) and Chalmers (2008).
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ter of him having different temporal parts at different times that have
simpliciter the incompatible properties. Temporal parts are entities just like
Cyrano, only temporally smaller, but not necessarily instantaneous – they
can be temporally extended exactly as Cyrano is. Thus, according to the
worm view, people are spatio-temporally extended worms that have tem-
poral parts, and the phenomenon of qualitative intrinsic change over time
is handled in terms of the possession of qualitatively different temporal
parts at different times.
Endurantism, on the other hand, claims that objects and people like
Cyrano persist through time by being wholly present at all times at which
they exist – they are thus multiply located at various times. Here is how
one could start to try to understand this claim:
Fig. 1
Such a picture of what endurantism is or could be is (would be) a strange
one. Try to consider the analogous spatial picture: an object like a person
“multiply located” at several places in a conference room, for example.
Imagine an entire audience at your talk, only composed of one “multiply
located” person that would thus occupy the whole room. Since material
objects are not universals, such a claim clearly sounds unacceptable, and
the more natural thing to say would be that there is not one single object
but a series of different objects laid before one’s eyes. Since we are working
here under an eternalist hypothesis, the endurantist picture about how Cy-
rano persists through time would then be as strange as in the analogous
spatial case.
None of this shows that there is a problem with endurantism. Rather,
it shows that the picture above and the way this picture suggests we
should understand how endurantism works is a bad one. To understand
why, and to better understand what the endurantist claim amounts to, let
us see how endurantists typically answer an often-raised objection against
their view: the Lewis-style objection from temporary intrinsics. Following
endurantism, Cyrano at t1 is numerically identical to Cyrano at t6. At t1,
he has a big nose, at t6, he has a small nose. But if we follow Leibniz Law,
then if Cyrano at t1 and Cyrano at t6 are numerically identical then they
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should have all the same properties. But this leads to the untenable claim
that Cyrano, the very same object existing at t1 and t6, has the two incom-
patible properties of having a big nose and having a small nose. David
Lewis once considered this problem to be “the principal and decisive ob-
jection against endurance” (Lewis 1986, p. 203). To answer any worries
about the possession of incompatible properties, perdurantists defend a
claim that is revisionary about what it is that has the incompatible proper-
ties: temporal parts, rather than “whole” people – since the different tem-
poral parts that compose a single space-time worm are not numerically
identical, no threat of contradiction arises here. Endurantists typically ap-
peal to at least two different strategies to answer the Lewisian worry. The
first is Peter Van Inwagen’s strategy (Van Inwagen 1985), which is revi-
sionary not about what it is that has the incompatible properties, but
about the properties themselves. According to such a view, properties are
always time-indexed and consequently Cyrano does not exemplify two in-
compatible properties such as “having a big nose” and “having a small
nose”, but rather he has the time-indexed properties “having-a-big-nose-at-
t1” and “having-a-small-nose-at-t6” which are perfectly compatible. Contra-
diction is thus avoided.
There is a follow-up to this argument that perdurantists often raise:
granted, there is no problem in the possession of the two time-indexed
properties, but even if we grant that there are such properties, there still
also are non-indexed properties like “having a big nose” and if that’s the
case, contradiction has not been avoided, because even if Cyrano has at
different times non-contradictory time-indexed properties, he also has the
non-indexed properties – and so trouble comes back through the back
door.
I find this perdurantist reaction somewhat strange. What it commits
one to is to claim that Cyrano’s possession of a property is his possession
of it simpliciter without any disguised relations to times being involved.
The reason why such a reaction is a strange one, coming from a perduran-
tist, is that while it is true that endurantism cannot accommodate this
claim, the perdurantist (worm) view does not accommodate it either. In-
deed, according to perdurantism, Cyrano also has his properties only via a
temporalizing device: Cyrano, the temporally extended space-time worm,
does not have a big nose. He can only be said to have this property by
having a temporal part that has it. As a consequence, neither endurantism
nor the perdurantist worm view can defend the claim that Cyrano has his
temporary intrinsic properties simpliciter.2 Perdurantists temporalize ob-
2 It is true that only the perdurantist worm view allows for something (but not Cyrano)
to have temporary intrinsic properties simpliciter, namely, temporal parts of Cyrano. I
will come back to this later.
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jects, while endurantists temporalize properties, and despite Lewis’s objec-
tion to the use of temporalized properties, and Van Inwagen’s objection
to the use of temporalized objects (see for instance Van Inwagen 1985, p.
194), what both views do is to use a theoretical temporalizing device that
plays the same theoretical role of making it possible for Cyrano to have
properties; more precisely, the device “to be a tn-part of” plays here the
same overall theoretical role, and helps to solve the same problem, as the
device “-at-tn”. I like to call such theoretical tools “problem-solvers”. In
short, a problem-solver is a primitive of a theory that is there to solve a
problem. Both perdurantists and endurantists account for the phenomen-
on of intrinsic change through time by using their primitives: the tempor-
alization of objects, or the temporalization of properties. At the same cru-
cial places, both views introduce a tool with the same function: avoid any
contradiction arising from Cyrano’s persisting through time and having
incompatible properties. Thus, both endurantism and perdurantism use a
theoretical temporalizing device in order to avoid the threat of contradic-
tion from the having of temporary intrinsic properties, and so, not only
endurantists should be allowed to use their temporalizing device by their
opponents, but also we have just made a first step towards the claim that
the difference between endurantism and perdurantism is perhaps not as
big as one would initially think. Furthermore, what we learn here is how
we should picture endurantism correctly:
Fig. 2
Following Peter Van Inwagen’s way of drawing the picture, if t2 is the
present time, Cyrano is depicted as having a big nose, but he also has all
of his time-indexed properties, which he has at all times at which he exists.
This latter point is important, and we shall now see it brings us closer to
the idea that endurantism and the perdurantist worm view resemble each
other more than one could have thought. To better understand why, let
us examine the traditional “no-change objection” to the worm view.
The worm view’s solution to the problem of change through time in
intrinsic properties has raised a worry about its adequacy. Peter Simons for
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instance claims that the “four-dimensional [i.e. worm view] alternative is
not an explanation of change but an elimination of it, since nothing sur-
vives the change which has the contrary properties” (Simons 2000, p. 64).
The problem here is that instead of accounting for one object’s persistence
and change through time, the perdurantist gives us a story about different
objects (different temporal parts) that have different properties. Further-
more, if it is true that a temporal part of Cyrano has a big nose, it will
always be true – such a fact cannot, accordingly to the worm view, ever
change. One way to put this point as an objection is to charge perdurant-
ism with the allegedly unpalatable task to defend a “static” ontology where
everything just seems to be there and where no object can ever genuinely
change.
Now, the point of interest for us today is that this objection, if it were
correct, would apply in exactly the same way to endurantism. Under en-
durantism as well as under perdurantism, the fact that Cyrano has the
property of having-a-big-nose-at-t1 is true at all times and can never
change. All properties, according to indexicalist endurantism, are time-in-
dexed, and consequently any property that Cyrano has, he has at all times
at which he exists. Interestingly, he has at t1 the very same properties that
he has at t5, and so, the friend of the “no-change objection” can claim, he
does not undergo genuine change between t1 and t5 (and so on). My aim
here is of course not to object to endurantism. As many others, I believe
that these worries are easily answered. What is at the centre of my interest
here is that if the “no-change objection” applies, it applies equally to both
endurantism and perdurantism (and if it does not apply, it does not apply
to either of the two views).
3. The Statue and the Lump
We have seen above the case of temporary intrinsics which was supposed
to be an objection to endurantism and a reason to favor the perdurantist
worm view, but we have seen that it is not. And we have also seen the
case of the no-change objection which was supposed to be an objection to
the perdurantist worm view and a reason to favour endurantism, but it is
not. Either both theories are guilty or neither is. (Actually, if anything is
guilty here, it is eternalism.) Thus, we have seen until now two steps to-
wards the claim that the perdurantist worm view and endurantism work
in a very similar way in some crucial places of alleged disagreement. Let us
now see another traditional problem that is typically said to favor perdur-
antism over endurantism, and see the way the two views handle it: the
Statue and the Lump case.
At t1, there is a lump of clay that at t2 an artist forms into a statue. A
statue is thus created at t2. Let us suppose that it persists until some later
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time, say t3, and is then destroyed (squashed). Consequently, at some time
after its destruction, at t4, the statue does not exist any more but the lump
of clay still does: it persists from t1 to t4 where it existed at t1 in some
(let’s say cubic) form, then it was shaped into the form of a statue and,
after the destruction, it was shaped again into some other squashed form.
The traditional puzzle consists in the fact that in the interval of time from
t2 to t3, the lump of clay and the statue are one and the same object (they
have the same form, the same location, they are made up of the same
particles) but that if they were one and the same object, they should, fol-
lowing Leibniz Law, share all their properties, which is not the case since
the lump of clay has, for instance, the historical property of being cubical
at t1 that the statue has not. So, after all, the statue and the lump of clay
are different objects. But then, it seems that we have a situation where
two distinct objects coincide between t2 and t3, which is typically supposed
to be an unacceptable claim (as Lewis puts it: if the lump weights 500g,
and the statue weights 500g, and if both objects are there between t2 and
t3, why don't we have in this interval of time something that weighs
1,000g?). Traditionally, perdurantists use this case to show that their view
is superior to endurantism. Indeed, perdurantism has a simple reply: the
t2-part and the t3-part of the statue are numerically identical, respectively,
to the t2-part and the t3-part of the lump of clay. The t2-part of the statue
and the t2-part of the lump of clay do share all of their properties, and
relevantly, they don't have any different historical properties such as “being
cubic at t1” because none of them existed at t1. But this does not entail
that the statue and the lump of clay (the worms) are identical since for
instance the lump of clay has parts at t1 but the statue does not. So they
are not identical but they share identical temporal parts: they temporally
overlap. Consequently, following the perdurantist worm view, the case of
“coincident entities” is no more remarkable than the spatial case of two
overlapping roads, one of them being a sub-segment of the other (see Sider
2001a, p. 6 and p. 152). Endurantists, on the other hand, do not seem to
be able to face this puzzle as easily, since it is the entire statue, and not a
part of it, that is wholly present at t2 or t3, since the same holds for the
lump of clay, and since they are distinct objects because they do not share
all of their properties, the endurantist has to endorse the claim that, be-
tween t2 and t3, there are two numerically distinct objects that coincide.
This is why the case of the Statue and the Lump (as well as similar cases
involving coincident entities) is typically taken to be a strong reason to
favour the perdurantist view over endurantism.
Before we see if this is really so, let us concentrate more carefully on
how endurantism works and let us try to be more precise about the theo-
ry’s structure. To be more precise, we need to stop drawing the enduran-
tist picture in terms of drawings of people with big noses, and consider
what the picture looks like when representing the fundamental compo-
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nents of the nature of Cyrano. There are two main options: either Cyrano
is a bundle of properties, or he is a bare particular (substratum) that in-
stantiates properties.3 Under the view which is a combination of eternal-
ism, endurantism, indexicalism, and the bundle theory, Cyrano is a bundle
of properties (that is, all of his time-indexed properties) glued together by
a special primitive bundling relation whose theoretical role is to bundle
together properties in order to make particulars such as Cyrano.
Fig. 3
Now, how can such a view handle the case of the Statue and the Lump?
The perdurantist bundle-theoretic picture of the case is the following,
where the bundle Statue is simply a sub-bundle of the bundle Lump – this
is how, in terms of the bundle theory, we get the notion of temporal over-
lap used above by the perdurantist.
Fig. 4
Having learned how the endurantist (indexicalist) picture should look like,
we can now see how it can treat this case:
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Fig. 5
Lump is a bundle of time-indexed properties, Statue is a bundle of time-
indexed properties, and one of the bundles is simply a sub-bundle of the
other. Thus, such a picture provides a nice surprise for the endurantist:
she can use here the very same strategy to account for this case that the
perdurantist has been using all along. Exactly as under the perdurantist
worm view, the bundle Statue is a sub-bundle of the bundle Lump, and
consequently we get here an implementation of the notion of temporal
overlap. This notion gives us, under both perdurantism and endurantism,
the means to talk about two objects (if you want, you can say two “coin-
cident” objects, but they are not coincident in any objectionable way, there
are two objects in the perfectly acceptable sense in which there are two
objects where there is a common part of two Siamese twins), but also to
talk about one object (the common part of the two Siamese twins is one).
Both views can thus equally well account for talk of two objects and talk
of one object in a non-objectionable way. The endurantist can simply ap-
peal to the same strategy the worm view does.
(Nothing hinges here on the choice of the bundle theory, since the
same treatment can be given under both perdurantism and endurantism if
one embraces the substratum theory as well. According to the substratum
(or “bare particulars”) theory, Cyrano is not only a bundle of properties,
rather his properties inhere in a substratum that exemplifies them and
unifies them in order to make a (thick) particular. With respect to my
present concerns, this difference does not matter: whether it is a substra-
tum that unifies the properties in order to make a particular, or whether
they are united by the bundling relation, the resulting structure is such
that it can easily accommodate the notion of temporal overlap as it is
needed to provide a satisfactory treatment of the Statue and Lump case.)
It took us a little time to get here, since we needed to be careful about
clarifying how endurantism is to be understood, but here we are: first,
endurantists can handle as easily as perdurantists the case of the Statue
and Lump (as well as all similar cases involving so-called “coincident enti-
ties”), and second, the general and more important truth is that the differ-
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ence between the perdurantist worm view and endurantism is getting
smaller and smaller. Contrarily to how these two alleged enemies are
usually presented, both views implement the notion of temporal overlap.
4. Perdurantism and Endurantism – a Second Look
We have seen above that endurantists can easily face some of the strongest
objections that are often raised against their view, namely those that arise
from apparent cases of coincident entities such as the case of the Statue
and the Lump. Generalizing, we can conclude that endurantism and the
perdurantist worm view have the same explanatory power with respect to
the puzzle cases involving coincidence, and this completes another impor-
tant step towards the claim that the difference between these two views is
much smaller than what is usually thought. Up to this point, we have seen
that both theories appeal to a temporalizing device (”to be a tn-part of”
and “-at-tn”) in order to be able to say that Cyrano has a big nose or a
small nose, and that neither of them can say that Cyrano has a big nose
or a small nose simpliciter. We have also seen how both views can equally
face the “no-change objection” in the same way, and finally that both
views implement the notion of temporal overlap (indeed, of temporal
parts!) and that consequently they both can equally well provide a satisfac-
tory account of cases involving “coincident entities”.
All of these points have been considered to be decisive points of de-
parture between these two theories, and even decisive points in favor of
one over the other. For instance, David Lewis (1986, p. 203) at one point
thought that endurantism should be rejected because it could not make
room for Cyrano’s possession of a big nose simpliciter; Peter Simons
(2000, p. 64) thinks that the “no-change objection” is a deadly objection
to perdurantism; Peter Van Inwagen (1981, p. 90) thinks perdurantism
should be rejected since the notion of a temporal part (and thus of tem-
poral overlap) is unintelligible; and Ted Sider (2001a, ch. 5) thinks that
cases involving coincidence give rise to decisive arguments against endur-
antism.
What exactly is the correct conclusion to be drawn from my “second
look” at how perdurantism and endurantism work? If I am correct, does it
mean that at the end of the day there is no difference at all between these
two views, and that they only are some sort of terminological variants of
each other? No. Such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the considera-
tions I put forward in this paper, and I believe that it is also an incorrect
one, because there are some genuine and substantive differences between
the two theories.
A first and important point of departure between endurantism and
the perdurantist worm view is that while it is true that neither of them
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can say that Cyrano has a big nose or a small nose simpliciter, the worm
view can say that something has a big nose or a small nose simpliciter (i.e.
one of his temporal parts). A second difference between the two competi-
tors is that they are structurally different: this is easily seen if one uses the
substratum theory and not the bundle theory as I have done above, for
the perdurantist worm view will claim that there is one substratum per
time that unifies the properties of Cyrano at that time, while the enduran-
tist view will claim that there is one substratum only that unifies all of the
properties that Cyrano ever has. This justifies the endurantist claim that
material objects persist through time by being numerically identical at dif-
ferent times, while this is how perdurantists account for the claim that
nothing is ever numerically identical at different times and that objects per-
sist through time by having temporal parts. There is a link between these
two differences between our two theories, since it is only because of their
different structure that they exhibit a difference in the way the two views
can or cannot claim that something has properties such as having a big
nose simpliciter. Thus, what we have learned is not that the perdurantist
worm view and endurantism are somehow, on a general level, equivalent;
rather, we have seen that some traditional important points of departure
actually show how similar the two views are, but that they also are differ-
ent with respect to some other points. It would thus be incorrect to say
that they are “equivalent” or “merely terminological variants” in general,
while it is correct to say that this is true to some (important!) extent.
5. Adverbialism
In the discussion above, I have used the indexicalist version of endurantism,
but this is not the only strategy endurantists can appeal to in order to an-
swer the problem from temporary intrinsics. Importantly, there is the “ad-
verbialist” solution according to which one should not temporally modify
the properties of Cyrano, but his possession of these properties. Under ad-
verbialism, “Cyrano has a big nose at t1” is to be analyzed as “Cyrano has-
at-t1 a big nose” or as “Cyrano has t1-ly a big nose” as Johnston (1987) more
elegantly puts it. In this view, there is not just the possession of a property,
there is always t-ly having (or having-at-t) of a property. Any worries about
the possession of temporary intrinsic incompatible properties are thus easily
dissolved, since while it is true that Cyrano has a big nose at t1 and has a
small nose at t4, and so he has both the incompatible properties, he has the
former t1-ly and the latter t4-ly and this is how contradiction is avoided.
With respect to my discussion above, there is one important difference
between adverbialist endurantism and indexicalist endurantism: only in-
dexicalism, but not adverbialism, is compatible with the bundle theory.
The substratum theorist, if she wants to be an adverbialist, can say that
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there are three components in her view: a substratum, its properties, and a
relation of exemplification that holds between the substratum and the
properties (and which is time-indexed, as the adverbialist view requires it).
The bundle theorist, on the other hand, does not have room for such a
picture in her ontology, since she does not postulate a substratum that
needs to be related by a special relation to its properties – rather, in her
view, such intermediaries should be avoided and so she cannot be an ad-
verbialist since there simply is no suitable place where to put the adverbi-
alist index.4 This of course holds only for a very special version of the
substratum theory, namely an unpopular version of this view which insists
on there really being this third component in the theory: the (time-in-
dexed) relation of exemplification between the substratum and its proper-
ties. Many substratum theorists themselves often rightly agree that this is a
bad version of their view, among other reasons because of Bradley-like
regresses and related worries. As Sider (2006) in his recent defence of sub-
strata insists, this relation of exemplification should not be taken too ser-
iously, in the sense in which it is often claimed that exemplification is not
a genuine relation, that it is a “non-relational tie”, and that we shouldn't
“reify” exemplification (see, for instance, Lewis 1983, p. 351–355). To my
mind, these worries are justified, and relevant to my discussion in this
paper, if the friend of the substratum theory follows these recommenda-
tions, she then cannot be an adverbialist for the simple reason that if she
takes away from her view the ontologically significant relation of exempli-
fication there will be no good place to put the adverbialist index any more.
Only if she is not impressed by the troubles that arise when one takes
exemplification ontologically seriously as a relation (that one can put an
index on), has she the option of holding an endurantist-adverbialist-sub-
stratist view. (To my mind, this makes adverbialism an unpalatable solu-
tion to the problem of persistence through time in the first place.)
This being said, let us now see how adverbialism compares to indexic-
alism and to the perdurantist worm view. The first point of similarity
between these views holds: exactly as it was the case for endurantist index-
icalism and for the perdurantist worm view, adverbialism also has to use a
temporalizing device (”tn-ly”) in order to be able to say that Cyrano has a
big nose or a small nose: all three views thus cannot say that Cyrano has a
big nose or a small nose simpliciter. Furthermore, since the adverbialist
theory is here combined with eternalism (simply because I do not consider
presentism at all in this paper) it also has to (and easily can) face the “no-
change objection” for the very same reasons already seen in the case of
indexicalism (and the perdurantist worm view). Interestingly, adverbialism
4 If one were to put the index on the bundling relation, it would straightforwardly
become a perdurantist view.
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also implements the notion of temporal overlap and, exactly as the two
other views, it can equally well provide a satisfactory treatment of cases
such as the Statue and Lump case, as the following figure shows – analo-
gously to what we have seen in the indexicalist’s case.
Fig. 6
As a consequence, we can affirm that endurantism-adverbialism-eternal-
ism-substratism is not very different from the perdurantist worm view and
the endurantist indexicalist view with respect to the same (important)
points of alleged disagreement between endurantism and perdurantism,
while it does differ from the perdurantist worm view for the same two
reasons we have seen above concerning the difference between indexical-
ism and the worm view – the additional difference being here that only
the worm view, but not adverbialism, is compatible with the bundle theory.
6. The Stage View
We have seen above that perdurantism understood as the “worm view” is
not very different in many crucial respects from its traditional endurantist
opponents. But there is another popular version of perdurantism, namely
the “stage view” which, as we shall now see, is different from all the other
views, including the perdurantist worm view, in several important respects.
Indeed, as we will see, the stage view is the least similar to all of its compe-
titors – the surprise being here that the two perdurantist views are less
similar to each other than the perdurantist worm view is similar to endur-
antism.
Friends of the perdurantist “stage view” claim that Cyrano exists only
at one time: he is an instantaneous stage that persists through time by
having different temporal counterparts at other times. Contrarily to what
the worm view theorists claim, when we say “Cyrano” we do not refer to
a four-dimensional temporally extended entity – rather, there is a series of
stages interconnected by a counterpart relation, and ordinary objects such
being-
statue-
shaped 
 
weighing 
500g 
being-
statue-
shaped 
 
weighing 
500g 
 
Lump 
 
 
substratum 
Statue 
 
 
being-
lump-
shaped 
 
weighing 
500g 
 
 
being-
squashed
-shaped 
weighing 
500g t1-ly t4-ly 
t4-ly t3-ly t3-ly t2-ly t2-ly t1-ly 
Jiri Benovsky172
as Cyrano are conceived of as being the stages rather than the whole com-
posed of them. While persistence through time is thus understood as the
having of temporal counterparts at different times, the stage view does not
deny the existence of temporally extended objects – the four-dimensional
entities that are aggregates of stages – they exist as well as the stages do.
It’s just that, according to the stage view, the objects we ordinarily name
and quantify over are stages rather than worms.
The stage view, contrarily to all the other views we have seen above,
can claim that temporary intrinsic properties such as having a big nose are
had simpliciter by ordinary objects like Cyrano themselves, since such ob-
jects are (instantaneous) stages which can have their properties simpliciter
without making them to be (or to involve) relations to times. No threat
of contradiction can arise from the fact that at one time Cyrano has the
property of having a big nose and that he has the property of having a
small nose at some other time, since the object that has the former prop-
erty is a numerically different object from the one that has the latter (since
no ordinary material object exists at more than one time). In this respect,
the stage view is thus clearly different from both the worm view and en-
durantism.
Concerning the problem of change, and the “no-change” objection,
the stage view also behaves differently from its competitors. One way to
see this difference is to object to the stage view as being unable to provide
a satisfactory account of intrinsic qualitative change through time. The
worm view theorist can say that there is something that changes, namely
the four-dimensional space-time worm Cyrano: he is composed of all of
his temporal parts, and once one of his parts has any intrinsic property, it
cannot change, and it will always be true that it has (tenselessly) this prop-
erty, but the four-dimensional entity can be said to undergo a change by
having different parts at different times. Change is simply the possession
of different properties at different times, and the perdurantist’s worm can
easily accommodate this claim. And so can (obviously) the endurantist.
Not so (easily), however, if one endorses the stage view, for the simple
reason that there is no one thing that ever has the different properties.
The friend of the worm view can claim that the temporally extended Cy-
rano has his properties in a derivative way (he is F in virtue of one of his
temporal parts being F), and the endurantist can claim that he has differ-
ent time-indexed properties, or that he has them tn-ly, but there is nothing
like this available for the friend of the stage view in her theory. There just
is nothing in the stage view theorist’s world that can undergo a change.
The stage view of course can say that a given stage at t1 is F and will be
¬F at t2 in virtue of having as a temporal counterpart another stage exist-
ing at t2 that is ¬F. But, the objector says, this is only an appearance of a
solution for these two stages are just two completely different things. Mel-
lor (1998, p. 89) claims that “change needs identity as well as difference”,
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but there is only difference in the stage view, there are only different
things with different properties – and nothing that undergoes any change
at all.
Of course, the stage view theorist will not let herself be so quickly
defeated. What lies at the bottom of this point of dispute is a version of
the “Humphrey objection” only applied here to temporal counterpart the-
ory. The detailed (and interesting) discussion as to who is right and
whether the stage view (or any counterpart theory) can or cannot satisfac-
torily face these worries is not my present concern – I am not involved
here in the business of saying that the stage view is better or worse than
its competitors. My business is to say that it is different. And one way to
see that it is different is to realize that the stage view has more to do than
the worm view or endurantism in order to answer the no-change objec-
tion, and that contrarily to its competitors its reply has to be different,
since it cannot appeal to any one object having different properties at dif-
ferent times.
Thus on the one hand the stage view has the advantage of being able
to say that Cyrano has his properties simpliciter, while on the other hand
it seems to be in a weaker position with respect to the problem of change.
Both of these points come from the fact that the stage view’s structure is
different from the other view’s. According to the stage view, a person like
Cyrano is “no more” than an instantaneous thing, while all the other
views claim that in one way or another Cyrano is temporally bigger: he is
a bundle5 not only of properties he has at one time, but of all of the
properties he ever has. This important difference in the general structure
of the theory also creates a difference with respect to the case of the Statue
and the Lump. While the worm view and endurantism appeal to the no-
tion of temporal overlap in order to account for this case, the friend of the
stage view cannot do anything similar to this approach since there is noth-
ing temporally “big enough” that could be said to overlap in her view. At
a time t2, for instance, there is only one instantaneous entity that is a
statue made out of a lump of clay but there are not two coincident objects
at this time, since the reason for thinking that there could be two differ-
ent objects was that they were suspected to have distinct historical proper-
ties like “being cube-shaped in the past” or “having existed at t1”, but no
instantaneous entity has any such properties. It can be said to have them
by having different temporal counterparts at different times, but the coun-
terpart relation being flexible (context dependent) it will be able to have
different counterparts qua Statue and different counterparts qua Lump –
5 As we have seen above, if one wants to be an endurantist adverbialist, one needs to
appeal to the substratum theory, but this makes no relevant difference to my present
concerns.
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so what we have is just one object that has different counterparts under
different counterpart relations and there is no threat of ending up with
coincident entities. Again, my point here is not to establish whether such
a strategy is better than the one appealing to the notion of temporal over-
lap, I only wish to point out that (and how, and why) it is different, and I
have indicated several places (the very same places that make endurantism
similar to the worm view!) where this is so. On a general level, all of the
differences seem to come from the fact that the stage view takes objects
like Cyrano to exist at one single time only, while the competing views
take such objects to exist at more than one time.
What kind of a difference is this? Most importantly, is the difference
a metaphysical one, or is it merely a semantic issue? The difference cer-
tainly does not lie in what there is, in the sense that all views I have con-
sidered in this paper are eternalist and postulate the existence of the same
distribution of matter across space-time; furthermore, the stage view does
not deny the existence of mereological sums of stages that correspond to
the worm view’s space-time worms. The difference thus lies in the analysis
of what ordinary objects like tables or people are. Sider claims that such a
difference is merely a semantic/linguistic one, since the disagreement only
seems to be about ordinary language terms and reference – a disagreement
located in what we usually name and quantify over when we make claims
about ordinary objects (“Does ‘Cyrano’ refer to a worm or to a stage?”).
But metaphysics is not only about what there is (see for instance Parsons
2004 or Schaffer 2009); it is also, and perhaps even more importantly,
about how objects are. Granted, the worm view and the stage view agree
on what there is (i.e. on what stuff fills up the world), but it doesn't fol-
low from this that they agree on all metaphysical questions, precisely ques-
tions like what the nature of tables and people is, that is, how they are.
Consequently, the question whether Cyrano is a three- or four-dimen-
sional entity is a metaphysical one, and so it seems that the dispute be-
tween the stage view and the other competing views I have discussed in
this paper is not merely semantic/linguistic but genuinely metaphysical,
and that it is about whether ordinary objects are best conceived of as
time-bound (instantaneous) or extended in time.
We have seen that the debate between endurantists and perdurantists
is, to a large extent, verbal and that there is much less substantive disagree-
ment than we could have thought. But, importantly, genuine differences
and room for substantive disputes remain. I would like to suggest that this
is quite representative of the state of metaphysics, given the recent meta-
metaphysical ongoing debate: some areas of metaphysics, that we thought
were well explored and that we thought gave rise to competing incompati-
ble views, turn out to be places of merely verbal disputes. But not all. And
more: even “inside” one particular debate, like the persistence one, there
are merely verbal points and substantive ones. This is why I would like to
Endurance, Perdurance and Metaontology 175
emphasize something that is probably (hopefully) not very original: that
we should not make any too general claims about the status of metaphysi-
cal debates, and not even about a status of one metaphysical debate, in
order to claim that it is verbal or substantive or otherwise; rather, we
should do first-level metaphysics in detail, examine the nature of particular
detailed points of disagreement, and only then raise any meta-theoretical
claims, such as claims of metaphysical equivalence.
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